> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://sspwallet.gitbook.io/docs/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://sspwallet.gitbook.io/docs/ssp-enterprise/use-cases/corporate-treasury.md). # Corporate Treasury Workflow This guide covers a recommended SSP Enterprise setup for a corporate treasury — company-owned crypto holdings managed by a finance team with executive sign-off, vendor payments, and clear segregation between operational and reserve funds. ## Who this is for * Companies holding crypto on the balance sheet (treasury reserves, like MicroStrategy's BTC strategy) * Crypto-native companies (exchanges, infrastructure providers, protocol companies) managing their own funds * SaaS / fintech companies accepting crypto payments and managing the proceeds * Family offices with crypto allocations * Any business with corporate funds in crypto requiring CFO/CEO oversight ## Why corporates benefit from SSP Enterprise * **Self-custody** — eliminate counterparty risk to custodians. The Q4 2022 custody failures (FTX, Genesis, BlockFi exposure) made self-custody a board-level discussion. * **Audit trail** — every action logged with the signer's identity. Critical for SOC 2, ISO 27001, financial audits, and SOX-style internal controls. * **Segregation of duties** — multi-signer requirements naturally enforce that no single employee (including the CFO) can move funds unilaterally. * **Multi-chain** — corporates often hold BTC for treasury, ETH for protocol participation, stablecoins for vendor payments. One platform, many chains. * **Cost** — significantly cheaper than enterprise custody platforms, freeing budget for security audits, insurance, or hiring. ## Recommended structure ### Vaults — segregate by purpose Recommended starting structure for a mid-size corporate treasury: | Vault | Purpose | Typical balance | Threshold | | ---------------- | ---------------------------------- | --------------- | ----------------------------------- | | **Cold Reserve** | Long-term holdings, rarely touched | 70–90% of total | 3-of-4 (executives only) | | **Operating** | Vendor payments, payroll, OTC | 5–20% of total | 2-of-3 (finance team) | | **Hot / Petty** | Small recurring payments, dApp gas | 1–5% of total | 2-of-3 (finance team, lower limits) | This mirrors traditional treasury practice: a vault structure analogous to bank reserve accounts vs operating checking accounts. If you're a smaller company, start with **Cold Reserve + Operating** (two vaults). The Hot vault is useful when you have frequent small expenses (dApp interactions, infra payments) that you want kept away from the main operating funds. ### Signers **Cold Reserve vault:** * CEO * CFO * Board Chair (or independent director) * Head of Finance / Treasury * (Optionally) external signer — auditor, legal counsel, lead investor **Operating vault:** * CFO * Head of Finance / Treasury * Senior Accountant or AP Manager * (Optionally) CEO as backup **Hot vault:** * Head of Finance / Treasury * Senior Accountant * Operations Manager (someone who actually executes day-to-day) ### Threshold choice * **Cold Reserve: 3-of-4 or 3-of-5** — supermajority of executives required. Slow, deliberate, intentional. * **Operating: 2-of-3** — majority of finance team. Practical for daily operations. * **Hot: 2-of-3** — same threshold but tighter policy limits Avoid **N-of-N** for any vault — it creates single-person bottlenecks (any vacation or sick day freezes operations). ## Recommended policies ### Cold reserve vault ``` Daily Limit: None (you don't move cold reserve daily) Per-Tx Limit: None Whitelist: Strict Mode — only approved destinations (custodian for BTC sweeps, OTC desk for sales, operating vault for transfers) Time-Lock: 24 hours, ALL transactions Admin Approval: Required, ALL transactions ``` This is your "vault inside the vault." Anything moving from cold reserve should require a Board-level decision and have ample time for the team to flag if something looks wrong. ### Operating vault ``` Daily Limit: $250,000 USD (or 1 month of typical spend) Per-Tx Limit: $50,000 USD Whitelist: Warning Mode — auto-approve known vendors, require admin approval for new addresses Time-Lock: 4 hours for transactions over $25,000 Admin Approval: Required for transactions over $50,000 ``` Rationale: enough flexibility for daily ops (vendor payments, payroll) without exposing the company to a single-transaction wipeout. New vendors go through admin approval before they're whitelisted permanently. ### Hot vault ``` Daily Limit: $10,000 USD Per-Tx Limit: $2,000 USD Whitelist: Disabled (small frequent payments to varied recipients) Time-Lock: None (defeats the purpose) Admin Approval: None ``` Limit blast radius via small balances and tight per-tx caps rather than time-locks (which would slow this vault's intended purpose). ## Operating rhythm ### Daily * **Operating vault** processes routine vendor payments, payroll runs, OTC sweeps. Threshold met within hours, broadcast same day. * **Hot vault** handles dApp interactions, gas payments, small recurring expenses. ### Weekly * Finance team reviews **Operating vault audit log**: every transaction, who proposed, who signed * Reconcile against ERP / accounting system (Cryptio, Bitwave, NetSuite, QuickBooks) ### Monthly * **Treasury committee meeting** (CFO + relevant signers): review balances, flag anomalies, approve any cold reserve movements * **Sweep**: move excess operating funds to cold reserve to maintain target balance ratios * **Policy review**: any limits being hit? Any whitelist additions to formalize? ### Quarterly * **Internal audit**: pull the full SSP Enterprise audit log, reconcile against on-chain state, present findings to Audit Committee * **Signer review**: any role changes? Departures? Plan vault migrations if signer composition changes substantively ### Annually * **External audit**: provide auditors with read-only Viewer access to your SSP Enterprise organization. They can see all vaults, balances, transactions, and audit logs without being able to sign. * **Disaster recovery drill**: practice the recovery process with each signer's seed phrase backups. Confirms backups are valid and team knows the procedure. ## Compliance and reporting ### SOC 2 / ISO 27001 * SSP Enterprise's audit log provides the immutable, attributable record auditors require for "segregation of duties" controls * Two-device per signer satisfies "two-factor authentication" requirements * Open-source codebase is verifiable, satisfying "third-party security review" requirements ### SOX-style internal controls * M-of-N multisig is a stronger version of "two signatures required for material disbursements" * Per-signer limits enforce "delegation of authority" matrices * Time-locks provide "review window" controls ### Financial audit (Big 4 or boutique) * Provide auditors **Viewer role** access — they see everything, can change nothing * Export audit logs for the audit period * Reconcile on-chain state to GL via accounting integrations ### Insurance * Self-custody insurance is available from specialty providers (Evertas, Lloyd's syndicates, others) * Document your SSP Enterprise setup, signer composition, and policies as part of the underwriting process * Insurance carriers generally view two-device M-of-N favorably vs single-key custody ## Common corporate-specific concerns ### "What if our CFO is hit by a bus?" * M-of-N means the CFO alone cannot move funds, AND their absence doesn't freeze operations (as long as threshold can be met without them) * Each signer's SSP Wallet seed phrase + SSP Key seed phrase together can recover their position if their devices are lost * Backup procedures should be documented and tested annually ### "What if the company is acquired or restructured?" * SSP Enterprise vault control transfers cleanly: change the **Owner** (transfer ownership critical action), update **signers** by creating new vaults under new control, migrate funds * The on-chain multisig itself is unchanged by corporate actions — only the SSP Enterprise account control changes ### "What about sanctions / OFAC compliance?" * You control the address whitelist — implement OFAC SDN screening on every new whitelisted address * SSP Enterprise's audit log demonstrates that whitelisted addresses were screened and approved by named individuals * For high-volume operations, consider integrating screening tools (Chainalysis, TRM, Elliptic) into your address-approval workflow ### "What about employee turnover?" * When an employee with signer access leaves: immediately remove them from the SSP Enterprise organization (critical action, requires WK signing) * For vaults where they were a designated signer: **create a new vault** without them and migrate funds. (You cannot remove them from an existing vault's signer set — this is intentional cryptographic constraint.) * Plan for this: rotate operating vaults annually as a hygiene practice, even if no specific departure triggers it. ## Example: $50M corporate treasury, 25-employee company * **Vaults**: Cold Reserve (3-of-4: CEO, CFO, Board Chair, Head of Treasury), Operating (2-of-3: CFO, Head of Treasury, Senior Accountant), Hot (2-of-3: Head of Treasury, Senior Accountant, Operations Manager) * **Balance allocation**: 80% Cold Reserve, 18% Operating, 2% Hot * **Policies**: as recommended above * **Cadence**: daily ops, weekly reconciliation, monthly committee meeting, quarterly audit, annual external audit + DR drill * **Tooling**: SSP Enterprise + Cryptio for accounting + Chainalysis for AML screening ## Next steps * [**Creating Multisig Vaults**](/docs/ssp-enterprise/creating-vaults.md) — set up your treasury vaults * [**Configuring Policy Controls**](/docs/ssp-enterprise/policies.md) — apply the recommended policies * [**Inviting Team Members & Roles**](/docs/ssp-enterprise/inviting-members.md) — onboard your finance team and executives